]> git.apps.os.sepia.ceph.com Git - ceph-client.git/commitdiff
libceph: Use HMAC-SHA256 library instead of crypto_shash
authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Thu, 31 Jul 2025 19:02:27 +0000 (12:02 -0700)
committerIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Wed, 8 Oct 2025 21:30:45 +0000 (23:30 +0200)
Use the HMAC-SHA256 library functions instead of crypto_shash.  This is
simpler and faster.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
include/linux/ceph/messenger.h
net/ceph/Kconfig
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c

index 1717cc57cdacd3532e5de7d35f1c2d6eb4e1ef5b..4b49592a738fc3a6c4b91d7a1f771af94398620a 100644 (file)
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef __FS_CEPH_MESSENGER_H
 #define __FS_CEPH_MESSENGER_H
 
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
 #include <linux/bvec.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/kref.h>
@@ -412,7 +413,8 @@ struct ceph_connection_v2_info {
        struct ceph_msg_data_cursor in_cursor;
        struct ceph_msg_data_cursor out_cursor;
 
-       struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;  /* post-auth signature */
+       struct hmac_sha256_key hmac_key;  /* post-auth signature */
+       bool hmac_key_set;
        struct crypto_aead *gcm_tfm;  /* on-wire encryption */
        struct aead_request *gcm_req;
        struct crypto_wait gcm_wait;
index 0aa21fcbf6ece564c1599ed0d2538f824274494d..ea60e3ef08343af0124fa7ade4795d3382dc1a82 100644 (file)
@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ config CEPH_LIB
        select CRYPTO_AES
        select CRYPTO_CBC
        select CRYPTO_GCM
-       select CRYPTO_HMAC
-       select CRYPTO_SHA256
+       select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
        select CRYPTO
        select KEYS
        default n
index 5483b4eed94e1896db939d2fbdd5aff6cc4fd69b..c54c8b5a652612546ec3e1491e569358d5b6b69f 100644 (file)
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
 
        dout("%s con %p con_mode %d session_key_len %d con_secret_len %d\n",
             __func__, con, con->v2.con_mode, session_key_len, con_secret_len);
-       WARN_ON(con->v2.hmac_tfm || con->v2.gcm_tfm || con->v2.gcm_req);
+       WARN_ON(con->v2.hmac_key_set || con->v2.gcm_tfm || con->v2.gcm_req);
 
        if (con->v2.con_mode != CEPH_CON_MODE_CRC &&
            con->v2.con_mode != CEPH_CON_MODE_SECURE) {
@@ -723,22 +723,8 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
                return 0;  /* auth_none */
        }
 
-       noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save();
-       con->v2.hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0);
-       memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag);
-       if (IS_ERR(con->v2.hmac_tfm)) {
-               ret = PTR_ERR(con->v2.hmac_tfm);
-               con->v2.hmac_tfm = NULL;
-               pr_err("failed to allocate hmac tfm context: %d\n", ret);
-               return ret;
-       }
-
-       ret = crypto_shash_setkey(con->v2.hmac_tfm, session_key,
-                                 session_key_len);
-       if (ret) {
-               pr_err("failed to set hmac key: %d\n", ret);
-               return ret;
-       }
+       hmac_sha256_preparekey(&con->v2.hmac_key, session_key, session_key_len);
+       con->v2.hmac_key_set = true;
 
        if (con->v2.con_mode == CEPH_CON_MODE_CRC) {
                WARN_ON(con_secret_len);
@@ -793,38 +779,26 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
        return 0;  /* auth_x, secure mode */
 }
 
-static int ceph_hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con,
-                           const struct kvec *kvecs, int kvec_cnt, u8 *hmac)
+static void ceph_hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con,
+                            const struct kvec *kvecs, int kvec_cnt,
+                            u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
 {
-       SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, con->v2.hmac_tfm);  /* tfm arg is ignored */
-       int ret;
+       struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx;
        int i;
 
-       dout("%s con %p hmac_tfm %p kvec_cnt %d\n", __func__, con,
-            con->v2.hmac_tfm, kvec_cnt);
+       dout("%s con %p hmac_key_set %d kvec_cnt %d\n", __func__, con,
+            con->v2.hmac_key_set, kvec_cnt);
 
-       if (!con->v2.hmac_tfm) {
+       if (!con->v2.hmac_key_set) {
                memset(hmac, 0, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
-               return 0;  /* auth_none */
+               return;  /* auth_none */
        }
 
-       desc->tfm = con->v2.hmac_tfm;
-       ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
-       if (ret)
-               goto out;
-
-       for (i = 0; i < kvec_cnt; i++) {
-               ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, kvecs[i].iov_base,
-                                         kvecs[i].iov_len);
-               if (ret)
-                       goto out;
-       }
-
-       ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, hmac);
-
-out:
-       shash_desc_zero(desc);
-       return ret;  /* auth_x, both plain and secure modes */
+       /* auth_x, both plain and secure modes */
+       hmac_sha256_init(&ctx, &con->v2.hmac_key);
+       for (i = 0; i < kvec_cnt; i++)
+               hmac_sha256_update(&ctx, kvecs[i].iov_base, kvecs[i].iov_len);
+       hmac_sha256_final(&ctx, hmac);
 }
 
 static void gcm_inc_nonce(struct ceph_gcm_nonce *nonce)
@@ -1455,17 +1429,14 @@ static int prepare_auth_request_more(struct ceph_connection *con,
 static int prepare_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con)
 {
        void *buf;
-       int ret;
 
        buf = alloc_conn_buf(con, head_onwire_len(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
                                                  con_secure(con)));
        if (!buf)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
-       ret = ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs,
-                              con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt, CTRL_BODY(buf));
-       if (ret)
-               return ret;
+       ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs, con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt,
+                        CTRL_BODY(buf));
 
        return prepare_control(con, FRAME_TAG_AUTH_SIGNATURE, buf,
                               SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
@@ -2460,10 +2431,8 @@ static int process_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con,
                return -EINVAL;
        }
 
-       ret = ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs,
-                              con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt, hmac);
-       if (ret)
-               return ret;
+       ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs, con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt,
+                        hmac);
 
        ceph_decode_need(&p, end, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, bad);
        if (crypto_memneq(p, hmac, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
@@ -3814,10 +3783,8 @@ void ceph_con_v2_reset_protocol(struct ceph_connection *con)
        memzero_explicit(&con->v2.in_gcm_nonce, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
        memzero_explicit(&con->v2.out_gcm_nonce, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
 
-       if (con->v2.hmac_tfm) {
-               crypto_free_shash(con->v2.hmac_tfm);
-               con->v2.hmac_tfm = NULL;
-       }
+       memzero_explicit(&con->v2.hmac_key, sizeof(con->v2.hmac_key));
+       con->v2.hmac_key_set = false;
        if (con->v2.gcm_req) {
                aead_request_free(con->v2.gcm_req);
                con->v2.gcm_req = NULL;