mon/MonClient: bring back CEPHX_V2 authorizer challenges

Commit c58c5754dfd2 ("msg/async/ProtocolV1: use AuthServer and
AuthClient") introduced a backwards compatibility issue into msgr1.
To fix it, commit 321548010578 ("mon/MonClient: skip CEPHX_V2
challenge if client doesn't support it") set out to skip authorizer
challenges for peers that don't support CEPHX_V2.  However, it
made it so that authorizer challenges are skipped for all peers in
both msgr1 and msgr2 cases, effectively disabling the protection
against replay attacks that was put in place in commit f80b848d3f83
("auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge", CVE-2018-1128).

This is because con->get_features() always returns 0 at that
point.  In msgr1 case, the peer shares its features along with the
authorizer, but while they are available in connect_msg.features they
aren't assigned to con until ProtocolV1::open().  In msgr2 case, the
peer doesn't share its features until much later (in CLIENT_IDENT
frame, i.e. after the authentication phase).  The result is that
!CEPHX_V2 branch is taken in all cases and replay attack protection
is lost.

Only clusters with cephx_service_require_version set to 2 on the
service daemons would not be silently downgraded.  But, since the
default is 1 and there are no reports of looping on BADAUTHORIZER
faults, I'm pretty sure that no one has ever done that.  Note that
cephx_require_version set to 2 would have no effect even though it
is supposed to be stronger than cephx_service_require_version
because MonClient::handle_auth_request() didn't check it.

To fix:

- for msgr1, check connect_msg.features (as was done before commit
  c58c5754dfd2) and challenge if CEPHX_V2 is supported.  Together
  with two preceding patches that resurrect proper cephx_* option
  handling in msgr1, this covers both "I want old clients to work"
  and "I wish to require better authentication" use cases.

- for msgr2, don't check anything and always challenge.  CEPHX_V2
  predates msgr2, anyone speaking msgr2 must support it.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

diff --git a/src/auth/Auth.h b/src/auth/Auth.h
index 642164985e4b576f42a5fcb1585c3c6449803b81..845f56c9bd662424e39bdf952846308994c244ec 100644 (file)
--- a/src/auth/Auth.h
+++ b/src/auth/Auth.h
@@ -192,6 +192,9 @@ struct AuthConnectionMeta {
 
   std::unique_ptr<AuthAuthorizer> authorizer;
   std::unique_ptr<AuthAuthorizerChallenge> authorizer_challenge;
+
+  ///< set if msgr1 peer doesn't support CEPHX_V2
+  bool skip_authorizer_challenge = false;
 };
 
 /*

diff --git a/src/mon/MonClient.cc b/src/mon/MonClient.cc
index edff5f509586a58e44e6541430c6048fb80f7dc2..2c8108bd1043eb065a633e4fe05150934109404f 100644 (file)
--- a/src/mon/MonClient.cc
+++ b/src/mon/MonClient.cc
@@ -1583,13 +1583,8 @@ int MonClient::handle_auth_request(
   }
 
   auto ac = &auth_meta->authorizer_challenge;
-  if (!HAVE_FEATURE(con->get_features(), CEPHX_V2)) {
-    if (cct->_conf->cephx_service_require_version >= 2) {
-      ldout(cct,10) << __func__ << " client missing CEPHX_V2 ("
-                   << "cephx_service_requre_version = "
-                   << cct->_conf->cephx_service_require_version << ")" << dendl;
-      return -EACCES;
-    }
+  if (auth_meta->skip_authorizer_challenge) {
+    ldout(cct, 10) << __func__ << " skipping challenge on " << con << dendl;
     ac = nullptr;
   }
 

diff --git a/src/msg/async/ProtocolV1.cc b/src/msg/async/ProtocolV1.cc
index 551920d408ef5f7f0bdf8ea465f5eceaa1204b41..43363371bc35d05eb342a4113881ee9936e8dc07 100644 (file)
--- a/src/msg/async/ProtocolV1.cc
+++ b/src/msg/async/ProtocolV1.cc
@@ -2046,6 +2046,10 @@ CtPtr ProtocolV1::handle_connect_message_2() {
   ceph::buffer::list auth_bl_copy = authorizer_buf;
   auto am = auth_meta;
   am->auth_method = connect_msg.authorizer_protocol;
+  if (!HAVE_FEATURE((uint64_t)connect_msg.features, CEPHX_V2)) {
+    // peer doesn't support it and we won't get here if we require it
+    am->skip_authorizer_challenge = true;
+  }
   connection->lock.unlock();
   ldout(cct,10) << __func__ << " authorizor_protocol "
                << connect_msg.authorizer_protocol