#! /bin/bash # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Copyright (c) 2017 Google, Inc. All Rights Reserved. # # FS QA Test generic/421 # # Test revoking an encryption key during concurrent I/O. Regression test for # 1b53cf9815bb ("fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key # revocation"). # . ./common/preamble _begin_fstest auto quick encrypt dangerous # Import common functions. . ./common/filter . ./common/encrypt # real QA test starts here _supported_fs generic _require_scratch_encryption _require_command "$KEYCTL_PROG" keyctl _init_session_keyring _scratch_mkfs_encrypted &>> $seqres.full _scratch_mount dir=$SCRATCH_MNT/encrypted_dir file=$dir/file # 4 processes, 2 MB per process nproc=4 slice=2 # Create an encrypted file and sync its data to disk. rm -rf $dir mkdir $dir keydesc=$(_generate_session_encryption_key) _set_encpolicy $dir $keydesc $XFS_IO_PROG -f $file -c "pwrite 0 $((nproc*slice))M" -c "fsync" > /dev/null # Create processes to read from the encrypted file. Use fadvise to wipe the # pagecache before each read, ensuring that each read actually does decryption. for ((proc = 0; proc < nproc; proc++)); do ( range="$((proc * slice))M ${slice}M" while [ ! -e $tmp.done ]; do $XFS_IO_PROG $file -c "fadvise -d $range" \ -c "pread $range" &> /dev/null done ) & done # Wait a second for the readers to start up. sleep 1 # Revoke the encryption key. keyid=$(_revoke_session_encryption_key $keydesc) # Now try to open the file again. In buggy kernels this caused concurrent # readers to crash with a NULL pointer dereference during decryption. # # Note that the fix also made filenames stop "immediately" reverting to no-key # names on key revocation. Therefore, the name of the file we're opening here # may be in either plaintext or no-key form depending on the kernel version, and # no-key names are unpredictable anyway, so just use 'find' to find it. cat "$(find $dir -type f)" > /dev/null # Wait for readers to exit touch $tmp.done wait # success, all done echo "Didn't crash!" status=0 exit